Portland State University

PDXScholar
Geography Masters Research Papers

Geography

2007

An Investigation into Japan's Population: The
Current State of Decline
Joel Stewart
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/geog_masterpapers
Part of the Human Geography Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Stewart, Joel, "An Investigation into Japan's Population: The Current State of Decline" (2007). Geography
Masters Research Papers. 17.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/geog_masterpapers/17
10.15760/geogmaster.16

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Geography Masters
Research Papers by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document
more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

An Investigation into Japan's Population: The Current State of Decline

Joel Stewart

Submitted for partial fulfillment of Master of Science degree in Geography
Portland State University

Approved by: _____________________________________________________
Martha W arks, Advisor

Martha Works, Professor of Geography
Date:

Table of Contents
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................... ii
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1
Historical Overview of Population Growth and Change ..................................................... 3
Causes of the Decline in Fertility ......................................................................................... 6
Social Factors Affecting Fertility .............................................................................. 6
Attitudes, Stereotypes, and Gender Roles ................................................................. 9
Economic Factors Affecting Social Fertility .......................................................... 11
Policies Addressing the Shrinking Population and Workforce .......................................... 13
Fertility Policy ........................................................................................................ 13
Immigration Policy ................................................................................................. 15
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 16
References .......................................................................................................................... 18

List of Figures
1. Total Population: 1950-2050 .......................................................................................... 1
2. Total Fertility Rate: 1950-2050 ...................................................................................... 2
3. Changes in the Population Pyramid ............................................................................... .4
4. Phases of Japan's Demographic Transition .................................................................... 5
5. Changes in Marriage and Divorce Rate .......................................................................... 7
6. Relationship between TFR and Men's Time Spent for Family Work .......................... 11

List of Tables
1. Major Actions Taken by the Government Toward Declining Fertility Rate ................ 14

11

Abstract

Japan is facing a demographic crisis. The population is aging and shrinking at a
considerable pace despite the government's efforts to curtail the problem. This rapid
change in the demographic structure of Japan is bound to have stark implications on the
society and economy of Japan. The objective of this paper is to understand the issues that
allowed this impeding crisis to come about. A thorough examination of the current
literature on Japan's fertility and population issues revealed that a number of various
factors are causing the impending crisis. Some of the factors determined to be affecting
the population dilemma include the prevailing social conditions, attitudes, and practices
ofthe Japanese people, in addition to economic realities that constrain many people's
choices. The government of Japan has, over the past fifteen years, enacted a number of
policies to address the population crisis. However, these appear to have done little to
mitigate the decline in fertility. It is apparent that greater attention must be given to the
underlying issues that are causing the crisis. If the situation is to improve, a change in the
current mindset of how to amend the population problem must occur.
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Introduction

In the coming decades Japan will undergo significant demographic changes.
Population peaked in 2006 at slightly over 128 million, and could shrink below 100
million by 2050 if current trends continue (Figure 1). The coming hyper-aged and
depopulating society will have a drastic impact on Japan's labor force and could have
grave economic and social consequences. A combination of both social and economic
factors has reduced fertility rates to the lowest in Japan's history. The current fertility
rate is 1.3, well below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1, and it is projected to continue
to decline, thus creating the current demographic crises (Population Reference Bureau,
2006).
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Figure 1. Total Population: 1950-2050. Source: NIPSSR, Population Statistics of Japan
2003
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During the 1970's and 1980's the Japanese government took a wait-and-see
approach to the declining fertility rate. The government realized there was a decline, but
assumed it would correct itself. A 1989 study conducted by the Ministry of Health and
Labor revealed that the fertility rate had fallen to the "shocking" level of 1.57 prompting
the first measures to be taken to address the situation. Over the next eighteen years the
Japanese government enacted policies to rectify the falling fertility rate, yet it continued
to decline (Figure 2). The objective of this paper is to understand the issues that allowed
this impeding crisis to come about.
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Figure 2. Total Fertility Rate: 1950-2050. Source: Ministry of Health, Labor, and
Welfare, 2005.

The demographic challenge facing Japan is two-fold. The population is both
shrinking and aging at a considerable pace. There is concern from the government about
maintaining the social security system in addition to a loss of economic strength. This
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concern extends to the private sector where businesses are worried about having enough
workers and consumers to keep the economy from withering. Indeed, the labor force is
expected to shrink by 10% over the next 25 years (Chapple, 2004). Exacerbating this
problem is the rapidly growing percentage of elderly in the population. Currently the
elderly, those aged 65 and older, make up 21% of the total population (Statistical
Handbook of Japan, 2005). By 2050 this number is projected to grow to 35.7% (Figure
3). Added to this is the increase in the age dependency ratio, "the ratio of the elderly
population aged 65 or more to the working-age population aged 15-64" (Atoh, 2000).
This ratio is expected to rise from its mid 90's level of 29% to 59% by 2050. This means
"each elderly person will be supported by only 1.3 working people in 2055, compared
with 3.3 people in 2005" (Japan Times, 2007). Perhaps the condition of the population is
most accurately captured by demographer Julian Chapple of the Kyoto Sangyo
University who said "the situation in Japan is fast becoming critical and proactive
measures are needed urgently" (Chapple, 2004). While measures and policies have been
enacted, in order to produce more effective changes further analysis of the underlying
causes of the situation is needed.

Historical Overview of Population Growth and Change
An historical overview of Japan's population growth and change sets the stage for
the current demographic crisis. Japan's demographic transition can roughly be divided
into five phases. Prior to 1868, the year of the Meiji Restoration, Japan was in a preindustrial period. During this phase Japan was in its pre-modem state, and the population
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of 30 million was stable because of the balance between high birthrates and high death
rates (Karan, 2005).
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Figure 3. Changes in the Population Pyramid. Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare, 2005.
After the initial changes of the Meiji restoration during which Japan emerged as a
global trading participant and shifted toward a modem society from its feudal past the
population rapidly increased. During this second phase of Japan's demographic
transition from 1868-1920, the development process ushered in a new era of urbanization
and industrialization. Advances in science and technology caused a significant decrease
in mortality, but fertility continued to remain high. As a result, the population grew to 40
million in 1887,50 million in 1911, and 55.9 million in 1920 (Figure 4). 1920 was the
first year that Japan took an official census and also marks the shift into the third phase of
its demographic transition. From 1920-1950 birthrates began, for the first time, to
decrease slightly. The birthrate declined from 36.2 (per 1,000)

~n

1920 to 28.1 in 1950.

During this same time death rates fell rapidly from 25.4 (per 1,000) to 10.9 (Karan,
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2005). The rate of natural increase peaked in 1950 at 17.2 and the population reached
83.5 million.
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Figure 4. Phases of Japan's Demographic Transition. Source: Karan, 2005.
The fourth phase of Japan's demographic transition is characterized by the
precipitous decline in fertility. The birthrate fell drastically to 13.6 in 1980 from 28.1 in
1950 (Figure 4). Death rates also continued to decrease reaching record lows of 6.2.
These factors account for the slower population growth, which grew to 116 million in
1980. The fifth phase, from 1980 to present, sees a steadying and slight increase in death
rates. Yet, birthrates persist in their downward march plummeting to 8.4 in 2005
(Statistical Handbook of Japan, 2005). Declines in birthrates are a common feature of all
modernizing, industrial nations. However, Japan's steady and rapid decline of birthrates
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over the past 25 years exceeds that of any other country in the world. As of 2006 Japan's
population peaked at 128 million and is now marked by a negative growth rate as a result
of the continuing decrease in fertility and concurrent increase in longevity.

Causes of the Decline in Fertility
There are both social and economic reasons as to why the total fertility rate has
fallen so drastically in Japan. There is little doubt that these categorical causes are
linked. It could be argued that social causes are the greater of the two, but each category
contains significant factors that played a critical role in bringing about the precipitous
decline of the fertility rate. While the two categorical causes are related they will be
examined separately.

Social Factors Affecting Fertility
Shoshika is the Japanese term given to the trend toward having fewer children.
This trend of the past few decades result from a number of related reasons. To begin,
marriages are occurring at a later age, and with much less frequency than in the past. In
the early 1970's the marriage rate, the number of persons married per thousand
population, averaged 10.0 (per 1,000 population). In 2005 the rate fell to 5.7 (per 1,000
population) (Statistical Handbook of Japan, 2005) (Figure 5). In contrast, according to
the National Center for Health Statistics, as of2005 the United States had a marriage rate
of 7.5 (per 1,000 population) (Center for Disease Control, 2004). In addition to the
reduction in the number of marriages, the average age at which marriage occurs is
increasing in Japan. In 197 5 the mean age for women at first marriage was 24.7. By
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2005 the mean age climbed to 28.0 (Statistical Handbook of Japan, 2005). The delay in
marriage has resulted in a postponement of childbearing, which often translates into
fewer children. The average age at which women bear their first child has risen from
25.7 in 1975 to 29.1 in 2005. All ofthese factors add to Shoshika, the trend ofhaving
fewer children, but what is prompting this change?
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Figure 5. Changes in Marriage and Divorce Rates. Source: Ministry of Health, Labour
and Welfare, 2005.

Increases in education and career opportunities for women have had a significant
impact on marital patterns and birthrates in Japan. More women than ever before are
earning college degrees, thereby creating more opportunities for themselves. In 1975 the
rate of women having four years of college or more was 12.7%. By 2005 this had
advanced substantially to 36.8% (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology, 2005). Coupled with this, the proportion of women in the workforce has
grown in recent decades. Among those in the workforce aged 20-59, the proportion of
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women has risen from 3 8.6 in 1980 to 41.3 in 2002 (Statistical Handbook of Japan,
2005). While this is not a significant increase, the noteworthy change is in the types of
positions obtained by growing numbers ofwomen. Because of the advances in
educational attainment, more women are landing higher paying jobs, leading many to
focus on careers rather than starting a family. Indeed the proportion of never-married
women in Japan is at an all-time high. In the last fifteen years the percentage of women
in their late twenties who have not married has risen from 30 to about 50 percent
(Tolbert, 2000). However, there are additional social issues that are part of the shrinking
fertility rate.
Many societal constraints are embedded in the Japanese culture, and more than a
few Japanese women are attempting to break free of these. Japan is considered by many
to be a very male dominated society. One backlash against this is the social phenomena
of"womb-strike." UC Berkeley Professor of East Asian Studies Michael Zielenziger
discusses this phenomenon in his book Shutting Out the Sun: How Japan Created Its

Own Lost Generation. This phrase is another recently added to the list of societal
problems facing Japan, and refers to women's genuine lack of desire to have children.
Illustrating this point are the results of a recent survey, which found that only 27.9% of
women thought childrearing would be enjoyable. The loss of free time was cited as the
leading reason (Chapple, 2004).
This free time, in addition to the increase in disposable income brought on by
increases in female employment has led to another term entering the lexicon; "parasite
single." These "parasite singles" are women in their late 20's and early 30's who work
for a living, but live at home with their parents. These women claim that living at home
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is the best of both worlds. They have little to no housework and pay no rent, giving them
more free time and money to do with whatever they want. Masahiro Yamada, professor
of sociology at Tokyo Arts and Sciences University, coined the phrase parasite single and
describes their situation. ""They suffer a dramatic fall in their standard of living if they
get married. On average they lose two thirds of their spending money. And they also have
to do housework. The gap between the two lifestyles is growing" (Scanlon, 2001 ).
Surveys show that this demographic group of parasite singles is the most contented in
Japan. For many Japanese women getting married and becoming a housewife is far less
enticing and hardly incentive enough to leave this lifestyle behind.

Attitudes, Stereotypes, and Gender Roles
Attitudes and stereotypes are additional points of contention in Japanese society
leading to lower birth rates. The unhappiness of some women with the social situation in
Japan was mirrored in a recent survey. 76% of those surveyed said that Japan was not a
good place to give birth and raise children (Chapple, 2004). Traditional gender roles are
yet another aspect of the societal issues affecting fertility. Childrearing tends to be a
female only task in Japan. Japanese men are rarely involved in household work, let alone
assisting in childrearing. A study conducted by demographer Makoto Atoh found that
Japanese husbands share of family work was conspicuously low. Time spent on family
matters averaged only 20 minutes a day on weekdays (Akachi, 2002). The importance of
the husband's share of family work could not be more paramount. A cross-national
comparison ofhusband's share of family work showed that countries where husbands
contributed more to family work tend to have higher fertility (Akachi, 2002) (Figure 6).
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Another aspect of this discontent is sure to come from comments such as the one
made in January by health minister Hakuo Y anagisawa. In a speech encouraging women
to perform a public service by raising the birthrate the minister said "Because the number
of birth-giving machines and devices is fixed, all we can do is ask them to do their best
per head" (McCurry, 2007). Another equally inappropriate sentiment was offered by
former Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro who "publicly expressed regret at the huge
number of women entering formal education and thus, presumably, deterring them from
their principal function in life, i.e. procreating" (Chapple, 2004). While it is obvious that
not everyone shares the opinion of the former Prime Minister or Health Minister, it is
apparently widespread enough to affect more than a few women's desire to have children.
The government has encouraged breaking down the fixed male and female roles
and shifting toward a more shared responsibilities and dual parenting approach. Because
of these fixed roles and attitudes the Ministry of Health & Welfare's Advisory Council on
Population Problems cited the "rectification of the stereotyped gender role division ... as
the main policy goal" (Atoh, 2000). It is beyond doubt that the social situation of Japan
needs to be reevaluated. Attitudes, roles, and stereotypes must be changed. This will not
be an easy task, but it is one that the government must tackle if it hopes to alter the
downward birthrate trend.
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Figure 6. Relationship between TFR and Men's Time Spent for Family Work (1985-92).
Source: UNDP, 1999.

Economic Factors Affecting Fertility

Economic issues are a factor affecting birth rate, and are far easier, as well as less
controversial, for the country's leaders to address than many social issues. One of the
initial ways that economics affects birth rates is through the decline in the utility of
children. This is a natural result of nations making the transition from an agrarian, rural
society to an industrialized urban society. This transition occurred in Japan during the
early to mid part of the 201h century and is not a direct factor leading to today's
population woes, but it cannot be overlooked. More pressing than the decline in the
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utility of children is the incredible costs of raising children in Japan. According to
demographer Julian Chapple, "many say they would like to have more children but can't
afford to. The financial burden ofhaving children is enormous and an obvious deterrent"
(Chapple,2004).
Childcare and education expenses are both having a negative impact on fertility
rates. Childcare costs are prohibitive in Japan, and this is one challenge that the
government is attempting to resolve. Child allowance, tax cuts, subsidies, and increases
in the number of childcare centers are all ways government is attempting to mitigate these
costs. Education expenses are quite another matter. While the government pays for
compulsory school, many families pay for services that extend beyond those provided at
public schools. In Japan, much of a child's future depends on the schools they attend, so
parents often pay for more expensive private schools hoping to increase their child's
chances of success. Often, there is the added expense of Juku, or private cram school,
which most children attend after finishing their day at public school. Opinion surveys
have consistently found education expenses to be the largest factor for Japanese couples
to limit their family size (Akachi, 2002).
The economic climate of Japan over the past fifteen years has done little to help
matters. Since the bursting of the Japanese economic bubble during the early 90's, there
has been a large degree of economic uncertainty exacerbating the problem oflow fertility
rates. To emphasize this, Professor of Population Economics, Naohiro Ogawa claims
"increased economic insecurity reduced marital fertility in the 1990's" (Ogawa, 2003).
Adding to this he states "women working as paid employees tend to be easily affected by
the business cyclical factors through fluctuations in their wages, and thus adjust their
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reproductive behavior" (Ogawa, 2003). The downward trend of the Japanese economy
has definitely been a factor contributing to the fertility rate's continued downward path.

Policies Addressing the shrinking population and workforce
Fertility Policy
It was not until 1990 that the government began to enact policies to counter the

fertility rate, which fell below replacement levels in the mid 1970's. The results of a
1989 report by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare revealed that fertility had
fallen to an all-time low of 1.57. Prior to this report, the general public had little
awareness of the falling fertility rate. As a result the findings of this report became
known as the "1.57 Shock." Shortly thereafter, under the auspices of the Office of
Cabinet Council on Internal Affairs, the government established an inter-ministerial
liaison committee for "Creating an environment where people can bear and rear healthy
children" (Atoh, 2000). This has remained the central theme of the government's
approach to correct declining fertility: "government should promote the creation of a
social environment to support young people who desire to marry and raise children"
(Atoh, 2000).
Fully aware that fertility is deeply related to each individual's private life, the
government has concentrated its efforts toward improving the environment for raising
children rather than encouraging "making babies" (Chapple, 2004). To this end, the
government has not issued any official documents stating a level of fertility it hopes to
obtain, nor has it "limited any effective means of fertility control" (Atoh, 2000). Indeed
government has gone to great lengths to stress that its policies are not pro-natalist, but
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rather are welfare and family policies. Historic reasons account for the government's
stance. Leading up to WWII, Japan's leaders tried to fuel the war effort by urging
women to produce as many children as possible under the slogan "umeyo, fuyaseyo"
'(let's give birth! Let's increase [the size and strength of the nation!])' (Chapple, 2004).
As a result, Japanese politicians are incredibly leery of creating too overt or forceful
policies.
The policy responses to declining fertility have primarily been aimed at creating a
more enticing and welcoming environment for having and raising children (Table 1). As
such, the government set forth three basic guidelines dictating the aims of policy directed
at declining fertility. These guidelines are "1) to keep hannonybetween family life and
occupational life, 2) to improve living conditions (such as housing), and 3) to support
family life and childraising" (Atoh, 2000). Table 1 lists the "major actions taken by the
Government toward declining fertility" (Chitose, 2003). Most of these policies focused
on issues such as child allowance, duration and wage compensation of parental leave, and
increases in the number of childcare centers and the services they provide. As can be
noted from Table 1 some of these policies have second editions. These upgraded and
renewed versions portray the government's recognition that efforts must be intensified.
For instance, the 'Childcare and Family Care Leave Act of 1995' increased the limits set
by the '1991 Childcare Leave Act' regarding both the duration and percentage of wage
compensation (25% to 40%) available to them during parental leave (Akachi, 2002). The
'New' Angel Plan extended the eligibility for child allowance, and increased the number
and capacity of childcare centers. Policies such as these, and the continued improvement
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of them, demonstrate the government's efforts to correct the decline in fertility.
However, despite these efforts the fertility rate continues to fall.

Table 1. Major Actions Taken by the Government toward Declining Fertility Rate.
Source. Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare Annual Report

TFR
1.54

TFR
1990

1.53
1.50

1991
1994

1.42
1.38
1.34
1.36
1.33
1.32

1995
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

1.29

2003

TFR
An inter-ministry committee "Creating a Sound Environment for
Bearing and Rearing Children established
Childcare Leave Act enacted
The Angel Plan or the "Basic Direction for Future Child Rearing
Support Measures" (1995-1999) formulated. The "Five-Year
Emergency Measures for Childcare Services" planned
Childcare and Family Care Leave Act enacted
The amendment to the Child Welfare Law enforced
New Angel Plan (2000-2004) formulated
Child Abuse Prevention Law enacted
The amendment to the Employment Insurance Law enforced
The "Measures to Cope with a Few Number of Children Plus One"
reported to the Prime Minister
The Law for Measures to Support the Development of the NextGeneration, the amendment to the Child Welfare Law, and the Law
for Basic Measures to Cope with Declining Fertility Society enacted

Immigration Policy

Immigration policy is another factor directly affecting Japan's population. With
shrinkages looming in the working population, immigration is one way that Japan could
mitigate the daunting demographic challenge now confronting it. However, Japan has
traditionally remained averse to accepting foreign residents. In 2000 there were only
1.68 million foreign residents living in Japan, accounting for less than two percent of the
total population (Karan, 2005). The pressures of the graying and shrinking population,
which pose a serious threat to the competitiveness of the world's second largest economy,
are causing Japan to rethink its attitude toward outsiders.
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For Japan to maintain its current level of economic output 600,000 foreign
workers would need to be brought in on a yearly basis (Karan, 2005). According to the
2005 census, only 1.3% ofJapan's working population (770,000) is comprised of foreign
workers (Hayashi, 2007). This is up from 0.9% (604,000) a decade ago, but is still a
very small percentage. While it seems highly unlikely that traditionally closed and
immigration resistant Japan will open the doors and allow in 600,000 foreign workers a
year, changes in policy are occurring.
In April of 2006 the Council on Fiscal and Economic Policy, issued a report on
the government's global strategy to reinvigorate the economy (Hisane, 2006). In order to
help maintain high economic output in light of the current demographic crisis, the report
calls for greater acceptance of foreign workers. The government is also to review the
type of work available to foreigners, create more flexibility in hiring them, and seek new
ways to attract more skilled workers. This shift in governmental policy, to encourage
more foreigners to work in Japan, demonstrates the government's concern of maintaining
Japan's competitiveness because of its shrinking working population.

Conclusion
That the Japanese population will, for the immediate future, continue to contract
and grow older is certain. What is uncertain is the effect this will have on the society and
economy of Japan. The drop in fertility is not the result of a single factor, but rather is
the combination of many related issues. Social issues such as increased educational and
career opportunities, and the phenomena of womb-strike and the parasite single affect
fertility. Having a more adverse impact on fertility are the stereotypes of, attitudes
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toward, and assumed roles ofwomen. Additionally, the economic constraints and
difficulties play a significant part in further slowing fertility. The question of how the
government should best handle this situation remains.
At present government policies have failed to halt the decline of fertility. If true
solutions are to be produced, there must be a rectification of the social and economic
disincentives limiting women's desire to bear children. Furthermore, a shift in the
predominant mind-set dictating the roles and behavior of male and female relations must
occur for changes to come about. Government is taking steps in the right direction, but
these measures alone will not correct the problem. Fertility issues are, by their nature, a
social and cultural phenomenon and the decisions concerning them are inherently
personal. Policies are generally ineffective at addressing fertility, especially so when the
government skirts the issue. New approaches for how to cope with the declining fertility
rates must be conceived if there is to be a chance of reversing the trend and staving off
Japan's impending demographic crisis.
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